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Beware of the scribes, which love to go in long clothing, and love salutation in
the marketplaces, and the chief seats in the synagogues,... [and who] devour
widows' houses and for a pretence make long prayers.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Real estate brokerage is a heavily regulated industry.2 Virtually
all states, including Nebraska, have lengthy statutory guidelines gov-
erning the process by which one becomes a broker, and the standards
1. Mark 12:38-40 (King James).
2. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-885.01 to 81-885.47 (Cum. Supp. 1984), the Ne-
braska Real Estate License Act of 1973, which sets up a State Real Estate Com-
mission to supervise the activities of brokers, defines what constitutes real estate
brokering, and identifies educational and licensing requirements.
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to which a broker must adhere.3 The regulatory schemes have a great
deal of consistency between the states. One provision frequently con-
tained in the statutes and followed in Nebraska is that members of the
public not meeting the guidelines and standards of the statute are pro-
hibited from bringing an action to recover a fee for services rendered.4
The restriction on fee collection is designed to discourage the unau-
thorized practice of real estate brokering. Unauthorized brokering is
viewed as being contrary to the public interest,5 and regulation is
designed to protect the public interest.6
This Article will review the role the real estate broker plays in a
typical residential real estate transaction, discuss how statutory guide-
lines and common-law theories of liability have served to protect the
real estate consumer,7 and analyze Nebraska's Real Estate Consumer
Protection Act to see what new protections are available to the real
estate consumer. 8 It is the thesis of this Article that traditional theo-
ries of liability and statutory regulation have provided insufficient
protection for the residential real estate consumer, and that a real es-
tate consumers protection act is an appropriate vehicle for providing
additional protection.
II. THE REAL ESTATE TRANSACTION
A. The Parties
1. Role of the Broker
Who is the real estate broker? At present, in Nebraska a broker is
someone having at least a high school education,9 and who has com-
3. Id. at §§ 81-885.11 to 81-885.14 (licensing). See also LB 101, 89th Leg., 1st Sess.,
1985 Neb. Laws (to be codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-885.48), which sought to
upgrade the educational requirements for brokers: "in each two year period,
every licensee shall furnish evidence to the commission that he or she has suc-
cessfully completed twelve hours of approved continuing education activities
4. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-885.06 (Cum. Supp. 1984). This is a common statutory re-
striction. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-61-102, 12-61-119 (1973); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 45-1401 (1979); FLA. STAT. § 475.42 (1981). See generally Annot., 39
A.L.R.2d 606 (1955); Annot., 169 A.L.R. 605 (1947).
5. See, e.g., Zilchin v. Dill, 157 Fla. 96, 98, 25 So. 2d 4, 4 (1946) (in exchange for a
monopoly to engage in a lucrative business "the broker must conduct himself
honestly in the business."); Stevens v. Jayhawk Realty Co., 9 Kan. App. 2d 338,
677 P.2d 1019 (1984) ("the underlying purpose of the Kansas Real Estate Brokers
and Salesman Act is to safeguard the interest of the public.").
6. See generally cases cited supra note 5.
7. The phrase "real estate consumer" will be used throughout this Article when
either or both the buyer or the seller are being referred to. A real estate con-
sumer is a consumer of residential real estate and, frequently, a consumer of the
broker's services.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 103-28.
9. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-885.13 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
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piled at least 120 additional hours of study in courses approved by the
state Real Estate Commission.' 0 In addition, she will have served for
at least two years as a licensed sales person,11 and have passed a writ-
ten exam dealing with real estate transactions.12 After passing the
exam, the broker is licensed' 3 and can serve as a facilitator of real
estate transfers.14
As the facilitator of residential real estate transfers the broker per-
forms several tasks for both the vendor and the purchaser of the prop-
erty. The relationship between the vendor and the broker is
established by entering into a listing contract. This contract sets out
the duties of the broker and the obligations of the seller. Even at this
early stage of the real estate transfer process, the control the broker
exercises over the transaction is apparent. Note that there are several
distinct types of listing contracts,15 but the one recommended by the
10. Id.
11. Id. The person may avoid this requirement by additional study. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. As used in sections 81-885.01 to 81-885.47, unless the context requires otherwise:
(1) Real estate shall mean and include condominiums and lease-
holds, as well as any other interest or estate in land, whether corporeal,
incorporeal, freehold, or nonfreehold, and whether the real estate is situ-
ated in this state or elsewhere;
(2) Broker shall mean any person who for a fee, commission, or any
other valuable consideration, or with the intent or expectation of receiv-
ing the same from another, negotiates or attempts to negotiate the list-
ing, sale, purchase, exchange, rent, or lease or option for any real estate
or improvements thereon, or assists in procuring prospects or holds him-
self out as a referral agent for the purpose of securing prospects for the
listing, sale, purchase, exchange, renting, leasing, or optioning of any real
estate or collects rents or attempts to collect rents, or holds himself out
as engaged in any of the foregoing. Broker shall also include any person:
(a) Employed by or on behalf of the owner or owners of lots or other
parcels or real estate at a salary, fee, commission, or any other valuable
consideration to sell such real estate or any part thereof in lots or parcels
or make other disposition thereof; (b) who engages in the business of
charging an advance fee in connection with any contract whereby he or
she undertakes primarily to promote the sale of real estate either
through its listing in a publication issued primarily for such purpose, or
for referral of information concerning such real estate to brokers, or
both; (c) who auctions, offers, attempts, or agrees to auction real estate;
or (d) who buys or offers to buy or sell or otherwise deals in options to
buy real estate.
Id. at § 81-885.01.
15. The types of listing contracts include: (1) the open listing contract, under which
the vendor becomes liable for the brokerage commission only if and when the
broker with a listing is the procuring cause of a ready, willing, and able buyer,
(2) the exclusive agency contract, by which the vendor designates a single broker
as his exclusive agent and the vendor retains the right to sell; (3) exclusive right
to sell contracts, similar to the exclusive agency contract, but the vendor remains
liable for the commission even if he sells without the assistance of the broker;
(4) net listing contracts, under which the broker only receives a commission if the
[Vol. 65:188
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National Association of Realtors (NAR) Code of Ethics is the exclu-
sive listing contract.1 6 The exclusive listing contract may be either an
"exclusive agency contract" or an "exclusive right to sell contract."
Under an exclusive agency contract the seller may negotiate the sale
of his own property without becoming liable for a commission; how-
ever, he may not contract with other agents to sell the same prop-
erty.17 Under an exclusive right to sell contract, the vendor is liable
for the commission on the sale of the property whether the sale is
negotiated by the broker or by the vendor himself. 8 Although the
NAR Code of Ethics does not identify which type of exclusive listing
the broker should offer the vendor, the most frequently offered con-
tract is the exclusive right to sell contract,19 under which the home-
owner is liable for the sales commission even if he negotiates the sale
of his own home during the listing.
After the vendor and the broker have entered into a listing con-
tract, the broker is bound to exercise his best efforts to find a ready,
willing, and able buyer.20 After the broker has procured such a buyer,
the vendor is liable for the commission even if he no longer wants to
sell 21 or does not want to sell to this particular buyer.22
The broker also may frequently assist the purchaser in the transac-
tion. Such assistance may be in the form of assisting in determining
property sells for over a specified price; (5) option listing contracts, under which
the broker acquires an option to sell at a specified price and must reveal his profit
upon exercise of the option and resale; and (6) the multiple listing contract, under
which the broker lists the property with a local listing service that coordinates
broker activities and gives wide circulation to information regarding properties to
be sold. For a full discussion of these types of listing contracts, see D. BURKE, JR.,
LAW OF REAL ESTATE BROKERs 28-38 (1982).
16. ' To prevent dissension and misunderstanding and to assure better service to the
owner, the realtor should urge the exclusive listing of property unless contrary to
the best interests of the owner." NAT. Ass'N REALTORs CODE OF ETHIcs art. 6
(1982) [hereinafter cited as NAR CODE]. Article 21 prohibits a realtor from tak-
ing "any action inconsistent with the agency of another Realtor." Article 21 is
designed to discourage interference with exclusive listings of other brokers.
17. See supra note 15.
18. See supra note 15.
19. Id. See also NEB. REAL ESTATE COMM'N, CONSUMER GUIDE TO BUYING AND SELL-
ING HOMEs (n.d.) [hereinafter cited as CONSUMER GUIDE]. The only type of listing
contract suggested is the exclusive right to sell contract. Id. at 4.
20. D. BURKE, JR., supra note 15, at 196. See Mansfield v. Smith, 88 Wis. 2d 575, 277
N.W.2d 740 (1979). But see Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d
843 (1967) (court adopted minority rule that the vendor becomes liable for the
commission only upon the closing of the sale). See generally Note, The Implica-
tion of a Promise to Buy or Sell Into a Real Estate Brokerage Contract. An Analy-
sis of the Ready Willing and Able Theory, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 380 (1966).
21. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Huntsman Farms, Inc., 267 Ark. 767, 590 S.W.2d 317
(1979); Halperin v. Pine Plaza Corp., 180 Conn. 85, 428 A.2d 340 (1980); Pottratz v.
Ferkins, 4 Kan. App. 2d 469, 609 P.2d 185 (1980).
22. Pottratz v. Ferkins, 4 Kan. App. 2d 469, 609 P.2d 185 (1980).
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the amount to offer for the property,23 drawing up the contract of
sale,2 4 aiding in the procurement of title insurance,25 and arranging
financing for the transaction.2 6
Litigation can arise from a break down in any stage of the process:
from disputes about the construction of the listing contract, to
problems in communicating the offer, to instruments involved in clos-
ing the sale, and frequently litigation has even arisen from problems
discovered after the closing.
The following sections of this Article set out the expectations of
the real estate consumer, review theories of liability applying to the
real estate broker, and analyzes the protections provided to the real
estate consumer under each theory. There are several recent schol-
arly articles developing these theories in detail,27 and restating the ar-
guments would be redundant. Therefore, the discussion is directed to
identifying the main protections and problems with each theory of lia-
bility.28 The final section reviews the Nebraska Real Estate Consum-
ers Protection Act,29 and discusses how this Act solves some of the
problems facing the real estate consumer not addressed by traditional
liability theories.3 0
2. Real Estate Consumers
Before discussing the theories of liability, it is useful to consider
what the parties to the transaction anticipate, and the role they expect
the broker to fill. Recognizing the reasonable expectations of parties
entering into a transaction involving a broker will help identify the
proper role of the broker. Once the proper role of the broker has been
identified, liability should attach when the broker does not perform as
23. Haymes v. Rogers, 70 Ariz. 257, 219 P.2d 339 (1950) (broker offering purchaser
such advice denied commission). See generally Currier, Finding the Broker's
Place in the Typical Residential Real Estate Transaction, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 655
(1981) (law governing broker's relationship with the parties to the transaction
needs to comport more closely with parties' expectations).
24. See generally Currier, supra note 23.
25. Stoppello, Federal Regulation of Home Mortgage Settlement Costs: R.E.S.P4.A and
Its Alternatives, 63 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1979).
26. Id.
27. D. BURKE, JR., supra note 15, at 191-238; Currier, supra note 23, at 660; Payne,
Broker's Liability for Non-Disclosure of Known Defects in Sale Property-Caveat
Emptor Still Applies, 6 REAL ESTATE L.J. 341 (1977) (broker is subject to same
duty to speak as principal/vendor, but imposition of liability upon broker remain-
ing quiet is rare); Romero, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability: Arizona's
Emerging Malpractice Doctrine, 20 ARIz. L. REv. 767 (1978).
28. Readers seeking more detailed knowledge of various theories are encouraged to
consult sources cited supra note 27.
29. L.B. 667, 89th Leg., 1st Sess. This Act is a unique piece of consumer legislation.
The review of the Act is based on the amended version of March 27, 1985.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 102-26.
[Vol. 65:188
1986] PROTECTING THE REAL ESTATE CONSUMER 193
the role demands and the parties expect. Traditional liability theories
will be shown to be inadequate either to determine the role of the
broker or to protect either of the parties to the transaction.
When the vendor engages the real estate broker the vendor ex-
pects: (1) the broker to produce only purchasers who are ready, will-
ing, and able to buy; (2) to have the broker advertise and show the
home; (3) to obtain the best possible selling price; and (4) to be assured
that the business of the transfer is proper. The buyer meanwhile an-
ticipates that the broker will: (1) show him homes that are within his
means; (2) show him homes of the type and quality and in the location
he desires; (3) assist him in making an offer on the home; and (4) assist
him in closing the transaction. The traditional theories of liability-
agency, dual agency, and tort-provide virtually no protection for the
buyer in areas he may need it most (e.g. in conducting the closing), and
only limited protection for the vendor.
B. Theories of Liability
1. Agency
The law of agency is so engrained in the field of real estate broker-
age that the broker is frequently referred to as a real estate agent.
The agent and principal relationship almost always exists between the
broker and the vendor, since the relationship arises from the signing
of the listing contract.3 1 The characteristic feature of an agency/prin-
cipal relationship is that the agent is the fiduciary of his principal.
The agent acts on behalf of his principal, not for his own profit, and is
subject to the control of his principal.3 2 The duties of the broker to
the principal vendor are frequently identified as the duties of good
faith and loyalty, reasonable care and diligence, and disclosure.33
31. Eckrich v. DiNardo, 283 Pa. Super. 84, 423 A.2d 727 (1980). See also Judd Realty
Inc. v. Tedesco, 400 A.2d 952 (R.I. 1979) (broker's right to commission is estab-
lished by listing contract initiating principal and agent relationship); D. BURKE,
JR., supra note 15, at 38.
32. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958) ("[An agent is subject to a duty
to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters con-
nected with his agency.").
33. Schepers v. Lautenschlager, 173 Neb. 107,112 N.W.2d 767 (1962). The court stated
that:
The duties and liabilities of a broker to his employer are essentially
those which an agent owes to his principal. A broker owes to his em-
ployer the duty of good faith and loyalty, and is required to use such skill
as is necessary to accomplish the object of his employment ....
Thne rule requiring a broker to act with the utmost good faith towards
his principal places him under a legal obligation to make a full, fair, and
prompt disclosure to his employer of all facts within his knowledge
which are or may be material.
Id. at 117-18, 112 N.W.2d at 773 (citations omitted).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
These duties require the broker to not disclose information that would
harm the vendor,34 properly advertise the property,35 and to commu-
nicate all offers to the vendor.36
Under the theory of agency many of the seller's expectancies are
met when the real estate broker properly performs the duties outlined
in the listing contract. Agency theory provides solutions when the
broker does not produce an able buyer,3 7 or when the seller changes
his mind after the broker has expended substantial effort in market-
ing the property,3 8 or when the broker enters into a secret contract
with a buyer to buy the property himself at lower than the best
price.3 9 All of these problems can be resolved under the traditional
theory of agency law. Damages are limited to recovery of the commis-
sion amount and to any unfair profit gained at the principal's
expense.40
In many ways, however, the real estate vendor is not protected by
the law of agency. The seller may be offered only the exclusive right
34. Haymes v. Rogers, 70 Ariz. 257, 219 P.2d 339 (1950) (broker denied commission for
revealing seller might consider lower price than that listed in the offer).
35. Kimball Bridge Rd. v. Everest Realty Corp., 141 Ga. App. 835, 234 S.E.2d 673
(1977) (negligence of a broker in listing an inadequate description of realty in
sales contract resulted in the unenforceability of the contract).
36. NEB. Ruv. STAT. § 81-885.24(19) (Cum. Supp. 1984). But see Carroll v. Action
Enter., 206 Neb. 204, 292 N.W.2d 34 (1980) (broker's failure to communicate all
underlying facts and circumstances of the offer creates no cause of action for the
prospective purchaser).
37. D. BURKE, JR., supra note 15, at 97-99 (broker failing to produce prospective pur-
chaser is not entitled to any payment absent a different agreement with seller).
38. Blank v. Borden, 11 Cal. 3d 963, 524 P.2d 127, 115 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1974) (en banc)
(vendor and broker entered into a contract allowing broker to recover commis-
sion if vendor withdrew the property from the market during the term of the
listing agreement; court enforced broker's right to commission). Nothing prohib-
its brokers from inserting clauses that allow for recovery of at least expenses.
The dissent in Blank v. Borden would not have granted the broker the entire
commission believing this amount to be a penalty. Id. at 975, 524 P.2d at 134, 115
Cal. Rptr. at 38 (Burke, J., dissenting).
39. Vogt v. Town & Country Realty Inc., 194 Neb. 308, 231 N.W.2d 496 (1975);
Schepers v. Lautenschlager, 173 Neb. 107,112 N.W.2d 767 (1962) (broker sold ven-
dor's property to broker's uncle who resold at substantial profit within one
month).
40. Schepers v. Lautenschlager, 173 Neb. 107, 120, 112 N.W.2d 767, 775 (1962) ("An
agent... who deals with the subject matter of the agency so as to make a profit
for himself will be held to account in equity as trustee for all profits and advan-
tages acquired by him in such dealings." (quoting Ericson v. Nebraska-Iowa Farm
Inv. Co., 134 Neb. 391, 399, 278 N.W. 841, 845 (1938)). In Vogt, the plaintiff vendor
was allowed recovery of the broker's commission and improper profit, but could
not recover the appreciation in the value of the property that was due to the
broker's improvements. Vogt v. Town & Country Realty Inc., 194 Neb. 308, 322,
231 N.W.2d 496, 504 (1975).
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to sell contract by the broker,41 instead of a more advantageous form
of listing agreement.42 The seller may not be informed that the per-
centage commission is a negotiable amount.43 The seller may believe
that the agent will read and interpret all offers and transfer instru-
ments, and protect the vendor's security interest in the property to be
sold.44 Such an expectation is reasonable considering that the vendor
retains the broker because she does not understand the real estate
transfer process. The broker is designated by statute as the party to
manage such transactions,4 5 and may neglect to suggest that the party
consult with an attorney if she does not understand the instruments.46
According to the Code of Ethics of the NAR, the broker shall "not
engage in activities that constitute the unauthorized practice of law
and [shall] . .. recommend that legal counsel be obtained when the
interest of any party to the transaction requires it."47 This statement
contemplates the existence of real estate transactions that do not re-
quire the services of an attorney. Additionally, the Code grants the
broker the discretion to determine when a party needs an attorney's
services. A party anticipating that the broker will read and under-
stand the transfer instruments is not served by the law of agency. The
agent is not required to disclose that he does not undertake to perform
this service, nor is it necessary that he recommend one who does.
Even simple real estate transactions may require an understanding
of the concepts of mortgages, due-on-sale clauses, or the intricacies of
an installment land contract. The real estate broker who provides
forms to facilitate these transactions is engaging in a practice requir-
41. See supra notes 15-16 for a discussion of the types of listing contracts available
and the wide usage of the exclusive listing contract.
42. Arguably, most vendors would benefit by retaining the right to negotiate the sale
of their own home without becoming liable for the broker's commission. Admit-
tedly, there are problems with the exclusive agency contract because vendors
may negotiate secretly with prospective purchasers presented by the broker in
order to avoid liability for the commission. Also, it is questionable how useful an
open listing arrangement is if one's broker belongs to a multiple listing service.
Any broker belonging to the multiple listing service who procures a purchaser for
the property can share in the commission at sale. D. BURKE, JR., supra note 15, at
14. A vendor would probably have his property equally advertised by listing with
a single broker belonging to the multiple listing service as by listing with several
brokers.
43. Typically the broker's commission is five to seven percent of the sale price. D.
BURKE, Ja., supra note 15, at 3. In recent years, the commission is likely to be
near seven percent. Whitman, Home Transfer Costs: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 62 GEo. L.J. 1311, 1336 (1974). Some commentators have expressed con-
cern that such lack of variation in the cost of service constitutes a restraint of
trade. Austin, Real Estate Boards and Multiple Listing Systems as Restraints of
Trade, 70 COLUZ. L. REV. 1325, 1338 (1970).
44. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 14.
46. See infra note 48.
47. NAR CODE, supra note 16, at art. 17.
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ing knowledge of law.48 The agent who neither explains the impact of
these different instruments, nor recommends that legal counsel be re-
tained, nor explains that he does not guarantee these instruments,
leaves the unwary vendor at great risk.49 Since the broker is making
the decision when to recommend legal counsel, the broker should be
bound in her fiduciary capacity to explain to the vendor whether she
assumes responsibility for understanding the documents. The broker
will most likely not be liable for damages for failure to construe cor-
rectly the instruments of transfer. She will not have breached any of
her duties as an agent. The law of agency does little to assist a vendor
in this instance.50
The law of agency offers the buyer of residential real estate less
protection than the seller. Typically, the broker is the agent of the
vendor and not the seller; therefore the broker owes no fiduciary duty
to the buyer.5 ' The buyer may suffer even greater detriment since he
may be unaware that the broker is not representing his interests. 52
48. Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998
(1954) (en banc) (preparation of real estate instruments constituted unauthorized
practice, but court did not enjoin). The standard practice in most localities is for
brokers to use standardized forms prepared by the local bar association. D.
BURKE, JR., supra note 15, at 361.
The issue of the unauthorized practice of law has a long and muddled history.
Just what constitutes unauthorized practice has been subject to debate, much of it
fruitless. See Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences
Really Make Good Neighbors---or Even Good Sense?, 1980 A.B.A. FOUND. RE-
SEARCH J. 159, 169-201 (1980). It is not my intent to suggest utilizing the concept
of the unauthorized practice of law to restrict the practice of real estate brokers.
I am not at all sure that such a restriction would be either in the public interest or
enforceable. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 27, at 785, wherein the author discusses
the landslide vote in support of constitutional amendment allowing real estate
brokers to draft transfer instruments in Arizona. Nonetheless, it should be obvi-
ous that legal education does address many of the issues arising in real estate
transfer. Whether the broker's education sufficiently addresses the issues that
arise remains to be seen.
49. See infra notes 73-75.
50. See infra notes 73-75.
51. Carroll v. Action Enter., 206 Neb. 204, 208-09, 292 N.W.2d 34, 36 (1980); Eggerling
v. Cuhel, 196 Neb. 745, 748, 246 N.W.2d 199, 201 (1976). See also Buffington v.
Haas, 124 Axiz. 36, 601 P.2d 1320 (1979) (vendor not able to recover against broker
purchasing property for a real estate partnership when vendor's interest was not
protected by a mortgage-unable to prove agency relationship).
52. See Currier, supra note 23, at 658-59. Currier describes the broker buyer relation-
ship as follows:
The broker-home buyer relationship often begins outside the context
of the sale of a particular home. The home buyer often calls a broker
recommended by a friend or business associate .... The relationship
thus begins on a positive and personal basis as well as a professional one.
No contract is signed which evidences the broker's loyalty and confi-
dence to the buyer, nor does the broker discuss his legal obligations and
responsibilities in the transaction .... The broker generally requests a
considerable amount of private information .... The intimate and
[Vol. 65:188
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Some commentators have suggested that the manner in which the
buyer-broker relationship develops encourages the buyer to believe
that the broker is representing his interests in the transaction. 53 The
buyer, believing himself represented, may neither actively protect his
own interest, nor seek representation from another. If in fact the bro-
ker were to represent the buyer's interest, he would be in breach of
the fiduciary duty owed to his principal, the seller.54
The law of agency has protected only partially the real estate ven-
dor, and provided virtually no protection to the purchaser. Nonethe-
less, some commentators have suggested that expanding the law of
agency to create duties owed to the purchaser would be beneficial to
the public.5 5 To create these duties they have utilized the concept of
the dual agent.
2. Dual Agency
Occasionally brokers charged with breach of fiduciary duty have
attempted the defense that they were acting as agent of both the buyer
and the seller.56 As a dual agent the broker serves as the agent of both
vendor and purchaser. Either the broker is simultaneously the agent
of both parties, or during the course of the transaction the broker's
allegiance switches. The broker would serve as the seller's agent in
advertising and in showing the property, but at some point would
switch and become the agent of the purchaser and assist the purchaser
in completing the transaction, e.g., by assisting in procuring financing
and settlement services.
There are several problems with making the broker a dual agent.
The seller would have to consent to the broker becoming a dual
agent.57 There is no obvious point in time at which the broker would
become the agent of the buyer.5 8 The relationship of agency between
helpful nature of these discussions reinforces the buyer's attitude that
the broker is friendly and worthy of trust.
Id. See also Raushenbush, Who Helps the Home Buyer, 1979 ARiz. ST. L.J. 203
(1979). But see CONsUMER GUIDE, supra note 19, at 2 ("The licensee, who has [the
listing contract on the property] is working for the seller .....
53. See supra note 52.
54. Haymes v. Rogers, 70 Ariz. 257, 219 P.2d 339 (1950).
55. See, e.g., Comment, A Reexamination of the Real Estate Broker-Buyer-Seller Rela-
tionship, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1343, 1356-63 (1972). See also Natelson, Colorado
"Buyer Brokerage": Does It Still Exist After Velten v. Robertson?, 55 U. COLO. L.
REV. 83 (1983).
56. Vogt v. Town & Country, Inc., 194 Neb. 308, 313, 231 N.W.2d 496, 500 (1975).
57. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-885.24(22) (Cum. Supp. 1984), prohibits the broker from
"acting for more than one party in a transaction without the knowledge of all
parties for whom he or she acts." The seller may not want to give up any per-
ceived advantages of having his or her own agent and as a result may not consent
to the broker becoming a dual representative.
58. See Currier, supra note 54, at 656-58 (discussing how the relationship of the bro-
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the broker and seller arises upon the signing of the listing contract,
but there is no comparable agreement establishing the relationship be-
tween the buyer and broker. In addition, if the broker attempted to
act as a dual agent throughout the transaction, his usefulness to either
party would be substantially reduced. He could not assist either party
in negotiation, because to gain an advantage for one party is to lose the
advantage for other. The broker would technically be reduced to the
status of a middleman who brings the parties together. Furthermore,
making the broker the agent of both parties does not guarantee that
the parties will receive the information they need to conduct the
transaction wisely.5 9 Either party signing a contract who does not pro-
tect his legal interests may have no redress even when the broker is
his agent.6 0
Dual agency does not resolve the difficult role the broker must
play.6 ' Instead, it becomes even more confused.62 The broker's duties
to the seller are not increased under the concept of dual agency. The
buyer may be as well served by reliance on tort law and the broker's
duty not to misrepresent when seeking redress for any injuries suf-
fered as by reliance on dual agency.
3. Misrepresentation
The broker owes to the buyer the duty not to misrepresent mate-
rial facts about the property being sold.63 The tort of misrepresenta-
tion occurs when the broker makes: (1) statements of fact; (2) that are
untrue and known by the broker to be untrue or recklessly made;
(3) that are made with the intent to deceive for the purpose of induc-
ing the purchaser to act upon them; (4) that in fact induced the pur-
chaser to act; and (5) in so acting legally injures the purchaser. 64
ker and prospective purchaser extends over time, even though a contract is not
signed establishing their relationship).
59. See supra note 48. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
60. Id.
61. See generally Currier, supra note 23.
62. Id See also Stambler & Stein, The Real Estate Broker-Schizophrenia or Conflict
of Interest, 28 J.B.A.D.C. 16 (1961).
63. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-885.24(21) (Cum. Supp. 1984) (prohibits the broker from
making any "substantial misrepresentations").
64. Suzuki v. Gateway Realty, 207 Neb. 562, 567, 299 N.W.2d 762, 767 (1980); Ames
Bank v. Hahn, 205 Neb. 353, 355, 287 N.W.2d 687, 689 (1980). Cf. Carrel v. Lux, 101
Ariz. 430, 420 P.2d 564 (1966). In Carrel the court lists nine factors constituting
the tort of misrepresentation: (1) a representation, (2) which is false, (3) which is
material, (4) which is known by the agent to be false, (5) the agent intends that
the purchaser act on the representation, (6) the purchaser is ignorant of the fal-
sity, (7) the purchaser relies on its truth, (8) the purchaser's right to rely on the
representation, and (9) injury proximately caused by the representation. Id. at
434, 420 P.2d at 568.
The purchaser cannot, by avoiding inquiry into a possible defect, later void the
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A broker may not misrepresent the value of the property,6 5 or any
facts that the buyer considers material to the transaction.6 6 A misrep-
resentation can be an omission to speak when a party's failure to
speak would mislead the purchaser.67 However, it is quite difficult for
the purchaser to recover when his theory of recovery is misrepresen-
tation through failure to speak.68
If the broker misrepresents the value of the property or material
facts about the property, the purchaser has the right to an election of
remedies. The purchaser may either affirm the contract and sue for
damages or disaffirm the contract and be reinstated to her position
before entry into the contract.69
4. Negligence or Malpractice
The application of negligence theory to brokers' activities has been
sporadic. It is difficult to draw any general rules defining under what
circumstances a broker will be found to have acted negligently.70 Neg-
ligence is a breach of the duty of due care exercised by a reasonable
person acting in like circumstances. 71 Some commentators and courts
have suggested that the malpractice liability of brokers is quite
broad.72 Brokers have been held liable for drafting a provision in a
contract by claiming misrepresentation by concealment or omission. See, e.g.,
Christopher v. Evans, 219 Neb. 51, 361 N.W.2d 193 (1985).
65. Smith v. Carroll Realty Co., 8 Utah 2d 356, 335 P.2d 67 (1959). See generally An-
not., 81 A.L.R.3d 717 (1977).
66. Supra note 65.
67. See Hauck v. Samus, 212 Neb. 25, 28, 321 N.W.2d 68, 70 (1982) (vendor is not liable
for fraud for failure to disclose material latent defects, unless evidence shows that
vendor was in fact aware of defects); Wolford v. Freeman, 150 Neb. 537, 545, 35
N.W.2d 98, 102-03 (1948) (dispute is over whether reasonably diligent observation
on part of purchaser would have discovered defects; if so, no recovery). Cf. Chris-
topher v. Evans, 219 Neb. 51, 361 N.W.2d 193 (1985) (discussion of what consti-
tutes concealment by vendor).
68. Wolford v. Freeman, 150 Neb. 537, 35 N.W.2d 98 (1948).
69. Christopher v. Evans, 219 Neb. 51, 54, 361 N.W.2d 193, 195 (1985).
70. See, e.g., Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 468 (1964):
[No rules of uniform application may be stated other than that, gener-
ally speaking, the broker is liable for all losses directly resulting from his
failure to exercise the standard of skill and care imposed on him by law
... diverse results [are] reached dependent on the particular facts
involved.
Id. at 473.
71. W. PROSSER, TORTs § 30 at 143 (4th ed. 1971).
72. See Romero, supra note 27, at 789-90 (agent may have a duty to explain the impli-
cation of all documents to all parties in the transaction). See also Morley v. J.
Pagel Realty & Ins., 27 Ariz. App. 62, 550 P.2d 1104 (1976). But see Buffington v.
Haas, 124 Ariz. 36, 601 P.2d 1320 (1979) (court limits the Morley decision discussed
in the Romero article: the duty to explain the impact of documents is limited to
that owed by an agent to his principal). See also Brink v. Martin, 50 Wash. 2d 256,
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contract that has unintended legal consequences, 73 for failing to draft
a provision necessary to protect one of the parties' interests,74 or for
failing to inform a purchaser of important facts about the property.75
The number of cases holding a broker liable for malpractice is ac-
tually quite limited.76 Part of the limited liability stems from failure
to define clearly the broker's duties, so that establishing a breach of
duty is difficult.77 Additionally, part of the limitation on liability of
brokers stems from the long standing dispute between attorneys and
brokers regarding the proper province of each profession.78 Some
courts have expressed reluctance to hold anyone except an attorney
liable when the person advises a party about legal rights.79 Since giv-
ing advice or drafting documents are considered the province of attor-
neys, others typically have no duty to do it properly.8 0
Although courts like to trot out the phrase "regulation in the pub-
lic interest" with regard to the activities of both brokers and attor-
neys,8 1 the question may legitimately be asked: how much regulation
is actually designed to protect the economic status of two powerful
professions?8 2
310 P.2d 870 (1979) (broker owed no duty to the prospective purchaser to prepare
an enforceable contract of sale).
73. Wisnieski v. Harms, 188 Neb. 721, 199 N.W.2d 405 (1972) (broker negotiated con-
tract for sale improperly included additional property).
74. Townsend v. Doss, 2 Ark. App. 195, 618 S.W.2d 173 (1981) (broker assured owner
that if balance of downpayment was not made owner could get her house back,
but failed to secure note by mortgage); Kimball Bridge Rd. v. Everest Realty
Corp., 141 Ga. App. 835,234 S.E.2d 673 (1977) (inadequate description of land to be
sold resulted in unenforceability of contract for sale; owner stated claim upon
which relief could be granted).
75. Monty v. Peterson, 85 Wash. 2d 956, 540 P.2d 1377 (1975) (broker failed to inform
principal-purchaser of significance of private restrictive covenants).
76. See cases cited, Annot., supra note 70.
77. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
79. Janssen v. Guaranty Land Title Co., 571 S.W.2d 702 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
80. Id.
81. See supra note 5. See also Janssen v. Guaranty Land Title Co., 571 S.W.2d 702
(Mo. Ct. App. 1978) ("The intendment of Rule 5... is to protect the public and
those charged with the administration of justice from individuals who are not
qualified and duly licensed attorneys .... The main purpose is not punishment
and certainly not punishment through the device of punitive damages."). Id. at
706.
82. Broude, Foreword, in D. BURKE, JR., supra note 15, at xviii-xix:
Nor does his text ignore somewhat more mundane issues such as the
ongoing battle between brokers and attorneys over the question of what
constitutes the practice of law, authorized or otherwise. While such ar-
cane contests may not be of much importance to the consumers of bro-
kerage activities, they do have quite an economic impact on the income
of two of our more pervasive professions.
See also Johnstone, The Unauthorized Practice Controversy, A Struggle Among
Power Groups, 4 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1955).
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Reasonable arguments can be made as to whether brokers are com-
petent to handle residential real estate transfers.8 3 However, it is dif-
ficult to frame an argument that grants brokers and lawyers a
monopoly in dealing in the instruments of transfer,8 4 yet holds only
the attorney liable for malpractice in the use of these instruments.
Arguably, the lawyer's economic status is protected because members
of the public will realize that only attorneys will be liable for improp-
erly drawn instruments. But the public interest is not protected by
allowing only realtors, not laypersons, to facilitate real estate trans-
fers and yet not be liable when this is done improperly. If brokers
execute transfers competently, as some have suggested they do,85 then
they have little to fear from malpractice liability. It is only the incom-
petent broker who will be liable in any case. Were malpractice liabil-
ity expanded to hold the broker liable when the reasonable
83. See generally Christensen supra note 48, at 208:
Competency may be a legitimate question. It is argued in the cases
that the field of real estate law is technical and difficult, requiring the
special skills of a trained lawyer. While this is so, it may also be argued
with some justification that a real estate broker who works full time
with real estate transactions might acquire sufficient command of that
field of law to function effectively in the drafting of those instruments.
There are some indications, to be discussed later, which suggest that
realtors may indeed be competent to perform those services that they
seek to perform in real estate transactions.
Conflict of interest is also of concern here. Potential for injury to the
client does exist by virtue of the fact that the broker's primary objective
is to make the sale and earn a commission. This might cause him, in the
drafting of the instruments and in the giving of advice to the client, to
ignore serious legal problems that might interfere with the sale. And
this would appear to constitute fairly serious risk of injury to the public.
Again the ultimate question is whether this risk justifies depriving the
public of the freedom to elect, nevertheless, to have these services per-
formed by the real estate broker in the course of putting together the
transaction.
But cf State v. Haas, 138 Ariz. 413, 675 P.2d 673 (1983). Haas was a criminal fraud
action. Haas represented real estate purchasers involved in a "Ponzi" scheme.
The purchasers entered into purchase agreements granting the vendors security
in "money assignments," "agreement assignments," or "trust deed beneficial in-
terests." None of these terms were recognized terms creating a security interest.
The court found that "most of the agents who attended and graduated from [real
estate schools in Arizona] were not taught the meaning of the terms [Haas] used.
In fact, most of the seller's agents who testified at the trial had not appreciated
the meaning of the phrases used in the offers." Id. at 419-20, 675 P.2d at 680. Yet
the defendant Haas had successfully made hundreds of such sales, and in four of
the five in which he was found guilty of fraud neither the agent nor the seller
were aware no lien was preserved. Fraud on such a massive scale as this, and
undetected by so many participants to the transfers, hardly speaks for the suffi-
ciency of education of brokers, at least in the state of Arizona.
84. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
85. Johnstone, supra note 82, at 12 (brokers possess legal knowledge in areas closely
connected to their business, and they can easily communicate such knowledge to
the public in the course of the transaction).
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expectations of the principal are not protected by the instruments of
transfer, brokers might be of more assistance to real estate consumers.
Malpractice liability does not, however, solve the problem of to
whom the duty is owed. In Arizona, where by constitutional amend-
ment brokers are allowed to draft documents for residential real es-
tate transfers, brokers can be held liable for malpractice.8 6 The initial
application of the law of malpractice in Arizona suggested that bro-
kers could be liable if their malpractice injured one who was not their
principal.87 This broad application of the doctrine has subsequently
been narrowed. Presently the broker is only liable in malpractice to
his principal.88 Therefore, the doctrine of malpractice will be of little
assistance to one who is not the principal but is relying on the broker's
expertise.
The preceding analysis has revealed the shortcomings of tradi-
tional theories of liability when applied to real estate brokers. Despite
heavy regulation of the brokerage industry,8 9 the real estate consumer
is offered few protections, and even fewer remedies. Agency theory
fails to protect the purchaser as well as the seller. The real estate
purchaser may be unaware of his need of representation because he
may believe the broker represents his interests90 or he may view
many costs as fixed that are actually negotiable.91 While some com-
86. Morley v. J. Pagel Realty & Ins., 27 Ariz. App. 62,550 P.2d 1104 (1976). Arizona is
not alone in allowing malpractice recovery. See also Townsend v. Doss, 618
S.W.2d 173 (Ark. App. 1981) (realtor had duty to inform seller to secure purchase
price by use of a mortgage).
87. Morley v. J. Pagel Realty & Ins., 27 Ariz. App. 62, 550 P.2d 1104 (1976) (brokers
bear the "responsibility and duty of explaining to the persons involved the impli-
cations of the documents"). Id. at 66, 550 P.2d at 1108 (emphasis added).
88. Buffington v. Haas, 124 Ariz. 36, 38, 601 P.2d 1320, 1322 (1979) (in the absence of
an agency relationship no duty to explain documents).
89. Supra notes 2-4.
90. See supra note 52.
91. U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development & Veterans Administration,
Mortgage Settlement Costs (1972), reprinted in Real Estate Settlement Costs, FHA
Mortgage Foreclosures, Housing Abandonmen and Site Selection Policies: Hear-
ings on HR. 13337 Before the Subcomm. on Housing of the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 735 (1972). Among other items, the
joint report found:
The Buyer seldom decides who will provide settlement services for
him. If there is a choice, he usually depends upon advice of the broker,
escrow agent, seller, or settlement attorney. Often the buyer is or be-
lieves he is required to deal with a particular source for some or all set-
tlement services.
Competitive forces in the conveyancing industry manifest themselves
in an elaborate system of referral fees, kickbacks, rebates, commissions
and the like as inducements to those firms and individuals who direct
the placement of business. These practices are widely employed, rarely
inure to the benefit of the homebuyer, and generally increase total set-
tlement costs.
Settlement charges often are based on factors unrelated to the cost of
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mentators have suggested that the real estate agent should act as an
agent of both the buyer and the seller,9 2 such an approach is plagued
by practical and theoretical complexities. 93 Malpractice theory does
not adequately serve the real estate consumer suffering an unneces-
sary loss because the standard of care of real estate agents is not well
defined, agents may have no liability for poorly drafted instruments,94
or the person injured is not their principal.95
Only the theory of dual agency attempts to address the problem of
the uninformed purchaser by allowing the broker to assist the pur-
chaser in closing the transaction. However, all the theories--agency,
misrepresentation and malpractice--are post hoc remedies involving
litigation, high costs to the parties, and few benefits to the general
public as a real estate consumer.
The following section of this Article reviews the proposed Real Es-
tate Consumers Protection Act.9 6 Although much has been written
about protecting the real estate consumer,9 7 and federal legislation
has been enacted 98 and rapidly repealed,9 9 the real estate consumer
has not been granted any significant right to information regarding
the transaction in which he is about to engage.lOO The Nebraska Act
represents an attempt to grant the consumer greater control over the
real estate transaction by providing information about the process.101
providing the services. The overall level of charges tends to be signifi-
cantly lower when the charge for a service is not directly related to the
sale price of the property.
Minimum or recommended fee schedules by local legal or real estate
groups often do not reflect the actual work done and tend to increase
settlement costs.
Id. at 738-39 (numbers of paragraphs omitted).
92. Supra note 55.
93. Currier, supra note 23, at 674-77.
94. Supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
95. Id.
96. L.B. 667, 89th Leg., 1st Sess.
97. See, e.g., Note, Conveyancing-The Role of the Real Estate Broker and the Lawyer
in Ordinary Real Estate Transactions- Wherein Lies the Public Interest?, 19
DEPAUL L. REV. 319 (1969). See also Stoppello, supra note 25, at 368.
98. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88
Stat. 1724 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (1976)). The law was repealed little
more than six months after its enactment.
99. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-205,
89 Stat. 1157 (1976) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2602-2604, 2607, 2609, 2616, 2617
(1976)).
100. Stoppello, supra note 25, at 369 (describing what remained of RESPA as "a regu-
latory scheme that requires mortgage lenders to estimate settlement costs and to
disclose these costs to homeowners in a form that is of little value and that denies
homebuyers the right to know all of their actual settlement costs until the date of
settlement.").
101. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
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III. THE NEBRASKA REAL ESTATE CONSUMERS
PROTECTION ACT
The Act is a joint effort of the State Real Estate Commission and
the Nebraska Unicameral. 102 Section 2 of the Act notes that: "[d]uring
the lifetime of most individuals and families, the largest dollar-trans-
action in which they ever become involved is the sale or purchase of a
home. Experience has shown that for many people the transaction is
mystifying, complex, and perhaps misunderstood. 103 The purpose of
the Act is "to inform consumers of their rights in real estate transac-
tion[s]"104 at such a time that they might utilize the information to
make choices in how they will conduct the transaction. 0 5
The Act is a long overdue step in the direction of providing con-
sumers with vital information. In some instances, however, it perhaps
does not go far enough. The following discussion will review the infor-
mation required to be given and suggest what additional information
should be proffered.
The requirement that the information form be given before any
contracts are signed or before any real estate is shownOs is an excel-
lent requirement. As a practical matter the purchaser should be en-
couraged to take the form home, read through it, and then return to
the agent if he has any question. Acknowledging by signature that
one has received the form' 07 also serves to impress upon the consumer
the importance of the information form he has received.
The Act also requires that the purchaser be told that the broker is
not acting as his agent.10 8 This statement is printed in capital letters
and clearly communicates to the purchaser that the broker is not his
agent. This requirement should dispel the criticism frequently leveled
at brokers that they have failed to make their relationship to the par-
ties clear.109 Informing purchasers of their role initially should allow
the broker to avoid the awkward position of being asked what amount
constitutes a proper offer to the seller.110
The Act also informs the seller that he has the right to choose his
own insurer for the property and the right to refuse to insure the
102. L.B. 667, § 2, 89th Leg., 1st Sess.
103. Id.
104. Id. at § 5: "Every real estate agent [and homeowner who sells his own home] shall
give every consumer a written statement of his or her rights .... The form
shall be given prior to signing of any contractual agreements and before any real
estate is shown whether or not the real estate is for sale."
105. Id. at § 6.
106. Id. at § 5.
107. Id. at § 6.
108. Id. at § 7(1).
109. See, e.g., Currier, supra note 23, at 662-63.
110. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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property if he is paying cash.1 11 The statute does not require that the
purchaser be told he should purchase insurance covering the execu-
tory period-the time between signing the contract for sale and the
transfer of the deed-but arguably such detail would clutter up the
statute. The discussion of insurance should trigger the buyer's aware-
ness of the issue and the buyer could then inquire as to when insur-
ance should be purchased.
The Act further informs the buyer that he has the right to choose
his own title insurer,112 his own abstractor,113 how costs are typically
allocated for these services,114 and even defines points and informs the
buyer that these are typically negotiated.115 These costs, known as
settlement costs, 116 may add substantially to the amount of cash the
purchaser needs to close the deal. Although the Act makes no provi-
sion that the real estate agent serve as a clearinghouse of information
about the costs of these services, this additional requirement could be
of real benefit to the purchaser. It is useful for the purchaser to know
that these costs, e.g., points and title insurance, are negotiable with the
buyer; however, these costs may also vary among service providers.
The prospective home purchaser may be informed that there are set-
tlement costs in addition to a down payment, but he may be at loss as
to how to lower these costs. If the real estate agents were required to
provide the prospective purchaser with costs of various abstractors, in-
surers and lending companies, then the purchaser would be able to
ascertain the closing costs of a real estate purchase during the early
stages of the transaction. It is unlikely that many prospective buyers
would call several service providers to obtain price quotations. If,
however, the providers gave the brokers this price information, the
brokers could easily dispense it to the prospective purchasers. The
overall effect of this might drive down settlement costs. Service prov-
iders would not be assured of recommendations from lenders and
would be willing to provide price quotations to brokers in order to be
considered by the purchasers.117
Providing the purchaser with the knowledge that cost and alloca-
tion of costs may vary, although useful to the prospective purchaser by
111. L.B. 667, § 7(2), 89th Leg., 1st Sess.
112. Id. at § 7(5).
113. Id. at § 7(7).
114. Id. at § 7(6).
115. Id. at § 7(8).
116. Settlement services, the cost of which vary by location include: (1) negotiating
and preparing the contract for sale; (2) arranging for financing, including negoti-
ating points; (3) searching, examining, and assuring the title. Some commenta-
tors suggest that a fourth cost should be added. meeting statutory charges, e.g.,
back taxes. Although such charges are not technically a cost of transfer, they
may fall due upon the transfer. Payne, Ancillary Costs in the Purchase of Homes,
35 Mo. L. REv. 455, 460 (1970).
117. Stoppello, supra note 25, at 440.
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allowing him to estimate his costs, will not serve to drive down settle-
ment costs for real estate consumers in general. Decreasing the cost of
settlement is not one of the purposes to the Act,118 although such an
attempt would dovetail with many of the provisions already in place in
the Act. The broad purpose of the Act is to encourage consumers to
make informed decisions,11 9 and price information is certainly helpful
to informed decision making. Increasing the competitiveness of real
estate service providers may result in lower overall closing costs. This
would be an additional benefit of the Act that is achieved without im-
posing substantially more responsibility on the broker.
Section 7(9) of the Act allows the purchaser to receive upon re-
quest, and at least ten days before closing, a list from the seller "iden-
tifying, insofar as possible, by make, model, and general description all
appliances included in the sale and to receive a descriptive list of all
personal property included in the sale."120 This provision would be of
greater value to the purchaser were the seller required to comply with
its terms in an earlier stage of the transaction. In normal practices ten
days before closing will be after a purchase offer has been made and
accepted. In theory, the purchase offer was based on the belief that
certain fixtures and personal property were or were not to be included
in the sale, i.e., the purchase price reflected the belief that certain
items were being sold. The statute does not clearly define what the
buyer can do upon discovering he is not getting what he anticipated. A
reasonable modification of this provision would allow the buyer to re-
quest and receive a list from the seller prior to making an offer to
purchase. The seller should have little difficulty in complying with
this requirement, since the seller presumably already knows what he
intends to transfer with the property.
Section 7(10) allows the purchaser to receive a reasonable esti-
mated closing statement upon request, listing "all debits you are re-
quired to pay and all credits you are to receive."12 1 This is a much
needed provision because most home purchasers are simply not aware
of the numerous costs incurred upon a closing, and may not be pre-
pared to cover these costs in addition to any down payment. The pro-
vision falls short, however, in not providing a remedy for the
purchaser when actual costs significantly exceed estimated costs. In
order to discourage underestimation, with the possible ensuing delay
at closing arising from higher actual costs, the broker responsible for
making the disclosure should be required to advance the purchaser
the excess amount over a certain percentage, e.g., ten to fifteen per-
cent, in order to allow the purchaser to complete the transaction as
118. See supra text accompanying note 105.
119. Id.
120. L.B. 667, § 7(9), 89th Leg., 1st Sess.
121. Id. at § 7(10).
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planned. 22
The purchaser would be responsible for repaying the broker in a
timely manner. The effect of the addition to the provision would be to
encourage the broker to monitor the settlement cost estimates for rea-
sonableness. This is something the prospective purchaser is simply
unable to do, but relatively easily done by the broker who performs
these transactions with the same service providers on a routine basis.
Section 7(13) informs the buyer that "this is a legal transaction and
that [he] would be wise to consult with an attorney of [his] choice
before signing any agreement."s2 3 This is a significant difference from
the NAR Code of Ethics requirement that at the broker's discretion,
he "shall recommend that legal counsel be obtained when the interest
of any party to the transaction requires it."124 After reading the
twelve provisions discussing title insurance, points, home insurance,
and the need to negotiate many items, the home buyer should begin to
have a sense of the complexity and difficulty of the transaction he is
going to attempt. His awareness of the possible need for legal counsel
may be awakened.
Theoretically, since the amendment of the Code of Professional
Ethics rules on advertising in 1978,125 the attorney could provide bro-
kers with a fee estimate for the "specific legal service" of conducting a
residential real estate closing. The list of attorneys would be those
interested in conducting practices involving residential real estate.
The public may in turn rely on receiving legal counsel and avoid the
messy malpractice attempts directed at real estate brokers. Finally,
the price for legal assistance in real estate closings could reach a com-
petitive level. There exists the possibility of substantial benefit from
increased participation of attorneys in residential real estate
transactions.126
IV. CONCLUSION
The Act is a much needed step in resolving the difficult role the
broker has been requested to play in the transaction, 127 and in provid-
ing necessary information to the purchaser in a timely manner.12 8
122. Stoppello, supra note 25, at 444-45, suggests that federal law be applied to brokers
to require them to advance costs in excess of estimated settlement costs.
123. L.B. 667, § 7(13), 89th Leg., 1st Sess.
124. NAR CODE, supra note 16, at art. 17. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51.
125. ABA Model Cede of Professional Responsibility and Cede of Judicial Conduct
DR 2-101(B) (25) (1980). The Code authorized advertising 'If]ixed fees for spe-
cific legal services." Id. A footnote to 2-101(B) (25) notes that "the agency having
jurisdiction under state law may desire to issue apjropriate guidelines defining
'specific legal services."' Id. (emphasis deleted).
126. See supra note 83-84.
127. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 102-06.
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The Act also points a way to walk free of the swamp of unauthorized
practice of law. The broker serves an essential role as a facilitator and
negotiator in the transaction. But the real estate consumer should be
left with the definite and firm conviction after reading the disclosure
form that the transfer of residential real estate is a relatively complex
transaction. Any consumer not willing or able to negotiate points, or
understand the exceptions in a title insurance policy, should know he
can and should consult an attorney.
The Act requires the individual homeowner selling his own prop-
erty to provide the same information as the broker provides. It would
not be reasonable for the homeowner to be required to gather and dis-
seminate information about settlement service provider's fees; conse-
quently, the broker's role in the transaction would be enhanced. The
broker would not only be a source of information about properties for
sale, but also about the entire process of conducting a residential real
estate transaction. The purchaser would be encouraged to deal with a
broker because the broker could provide substantial money saving in-
formation to the prospective purchaser.
Rose McConnell, '85
